Abstract-Expert judgments are often used to estimate likelihood values in a security risk analysis. These judgments are subjective and their correctness rely on the competence, training, and experience of the experts. Thus, there is a need to validate the correctness of the values obtained from expert judgments. In this paper we investigate to what extent indicators based on historical data may be used to validate likelihood values obtained from expert judgments. We report on experiences from a security risk analysis where indicators were used to validate likelihood values obtained from expert judgments. The experiences build on data collected during the analysis and on semi-structured interviews with the client experts that participated in the analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a security risk analysis we often need to rely on expert judgments to come up with likelihood values of threat scenarios and unwanted incidents. These judgments are subjective and the correctness of the obtained values depend very much on the competence, training, and experience of the ones making the judgments. A lot of research have reported on procedures for eliciting expert judgment in risk analysis, decision support, and in general [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . There is also research that address the quality of expert judgments [5] . Common for most of these papers is that they report on formal uses of expert judgments. The formal approaches use specific procedures for the elicitation and document the reasoning and assumptions underlying the expert judgments. In this paper the focus is not on the elicitation and documentation of expert judgments, but on how we can validate the correctness of the values obtained from these judgments.
One way to validate likelihood estimates based on expert judgments is to use measureable indicators that are seen as relevant for the incidents to which the estimates are associated. In most cases we cannot infer the likelihood values from these indicators directly, but they provide relevant input for finding correct likelihood values. For instance, in the case of the unwanted incident "eavesdropper reading a sensitive e-mail", an obvious indicator would be the number of times this has occurred in the past. However, as it is not feasible to observe this, we will have to make do with other indicators. One potential indicator for this unwanted incident could for example be "the number of encrypted sensitive emails sent". Together with knowledge about the total number of sensitive e-mails being sent during a given period, this provides relevant input for validating the correctness of the incident's likelihood value.
In this paper we investigate to what extent indicators based on historical data may be used to validate likelihood values obtained from expert judgments. We report on experiences from using indicators to validate expert judgments in a security risk analysis conducted in 2010. The experiences build on data collected during the analysis and on semistructured interviews with the client experts that participated in the analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section II we present our research question, the security risk analysis from 2010, and the procedure for collecting and analyzing empirical data. In Section III we present the data collected during the analysis, and our conclusions based on this data. In Section IV we discuss our conclusions and use data extracts from the semi-structured interviews to enhance our understanding with respect to the conclusions. In Section V we discuss threats to the validity of the empirical study. Finally, in Section VI we conclude.
II. RESEARCH QUESTION AND METHOD

A. Research question
Our research question is a follows:
To what extent may indicators be used to validate likelihood values obtained from expert judgments in a security risk analysis?
B. Case: security risk analysis
Our empirical study is conducted as part of a commercial security risk analysis. This analysis was conducted in 2010, and it was not specifically designed for the investigation reported in this paper. As the client of this analysis required full confidentiality we will not report on the system assessed, the risk models obtained, the personnel from the client involved, or the name of the organization.
In the analysis the client presented us with a business objective that they need to comply with. To comply with
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Step V3: Identification of validation criteria Figure 1 . Relation between the level 3 risk analysis process and the validation process this business objective a number of requirements need to be satisfied. The purpose of the analysis was to document the different risks that could arise and harm assets of the client if the requirements are not satisfied. To conduct the analysis, the CORAS approach [6] was used. CORAS provides a method, a language, and a tool for asset-oriented risk analysis. The analysis was conducted at the following three levels:
• Level 1: Identify vulnerabilities with respect to the requirements. Select the vulnerabilities that require further analysis. • Level 2: Document possible high-level threat scenarios that may arise if the selected vulnerabilities from level 1 are exploited. Select the threat scenarios that require further analysis.
• Level 3: Do a detailed analysis of the selected threat scenarios from level 2.
As part of the level 3 analysis we validated the likelihood estimates, obtained from expert judgments, of unwanted incidents by the use of indicators. The relation between the level 3 risk analysis process and the validation process is depicted in Fig. 1 . The steps RA1-RA4 of the level 3 risk analysis process are equivalent to steps 5-8 of the CORAS method. The steps 1-4 of the CORAS method were conducted during the level 1 and level 2 analyses.
In step RA1 we used the selected threat scenarios from the level 2 analysis as a starting point for identifying and documenting unwanted incidents as well as threats, vulnerabilities, and the threat scenarios leading up to the unwanted incidents. In step RA2 we estimated likelihood and consequence values based on expert judgments.
Step V1 was conducted as part of step RA2. After conducting step V1, we identified indicators for validating the likelihood estimates of the unwanted incidents identified in step V2. The analysis team proposed a number of indicators, and these indicators were revised during a meeting with the client experts. During Table I shows estimates for the number of hours that were spent on each level of the analysis, as well as estimates for the number of hours that were spent on the steps of the two processes depicted in Fig. 1 . The estimates are based on the analysis team's own notes from the analysis. For the client experts we only have numbers for meetings. Thus, we do not know how much time they used between meetings, but we know that it was much less than the time spent by the analysis team. In total, an estimated number of 400 hours were spent on the analysis (not including writing the final report) by the analysis team. About 60% of these hours were spent on the two processes depicted in Fig. 1 .
Three domain experts of the client participated in the analysis. Table II show the education of the client experts, as well as their experience within information security and risk analysis.
C. Procedure for collecting and analyzing empirical data
For each step in the validation process, depicted in Fig. 1 , we have collected data relevant for evaluating the research The three interviews have been analyzed by the use of a simplified version of thematic analysis [7] , which is a method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. In [8] , theme is defined as follows: "A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the data set." In the thematic analysis, themes have been identified for the purpose of understanding and interpreting the data relevant for the research question that were collected during the risk analysis process (as documented in Table III) . Each theme consists of a number of data extracts from the different transcripts that cohere together meaningfully. In the discussion in Section IV, some of these extracts have been used to enhance our understanding with respect to the conclusions.
III. DATA COLLECTED FROM CASE
For each step of the validation process we collected data that are relevant for evaluating to what extent indicators may be used to validate likelihood estimates based on expert judgments in a security risk analysis. The IDs, definitions, and values of the different data, as well as the steps of the validation process they concern, are shown in Table III .
In the following we describe the data collected for each step of the validation process, before presenting our conclusions based on the data.
A. Data for step V1
The risk analysis resulted in 28 (ID 1.1 in Table III) unwanted incidents. As we can see from Table III , all (1.2) these unwanted incidents were assigned likelihood estimates based on expert judgments.
B. Data for step V2
In step V2 of the validation process, the analysis team proposed one or more indicators for each of the 28 (2.1) unwanted incidents. In total, 81 (2.4) indicators were proposed by the analysis team, of which 68 (2.8) were unique 1 . For nineteen (2.12) unwanted incidents, the analysis team proposed indicators from which the incident's likelihood value can be inferred directly. By this we mean that the indicator was basically the observed frequency of occurrence of the incident in question.
The proposed indicators were then revised during a meeting with the client experts. After the revision had been conducted, 25 (2.2) out of the 28 unwanted incidents were associated with one or more indicators. In total this left us with 68 (2.5) indicators, of which 57 (2.9) were unique. During the revision meeting, three (2.6) new indicators, of which two (2.10) were unique, were added. 16 (2.7) of the proposed indicators were rejected during the same meeting, mostly due to their values not being obtainable within the client's organization. Of these indicators, 13 (2.11) were unique. The result of rejecting these indicators was that three (2.3) unwanted incidents were left with no indicators. Common for these incidents is that they represent events that are not easily observable.
As we can see from the data of step V2 in Table III , almost 20% of the proposed indicators were rejected. Eight (10%) of the indicators that were rejected are indicators from which incidents' likelihood values can be inferred directly. The result of this was that only 11 (2.13) out of 19 (2.12) unwanted incidents with indicators from which their likelihood values can be inferred directly were left after the revision process had been conducted.
C. Data for step V3
Validation criteria were constructed by the analysis team, in step V3 of the validation process, for 15 (3.1) out of the 25 unwanted incidents with indicators, of which eight (3.2) of the validation criteria, or more than 50%, use indicators from which the incident's likelihood value can be inferred directly. For the remaining ten incidents, validation criteria were not constructed. One (3.3) of these incidents was not assigned a criterion due to that the validation of its likelihood value was given a low priority by the client experts 2 . For the other nine (3.4) incidents, the analysis team was not Number of values for unique indcators that the client experts managed to obtain, where these values are used in validation criteria 13
Step V5: Revised expert judgments ID Definition Value
5.1
Number of unwanted incidents with a validation criterion where the criterion was fulfilled. 4
5.2
Number of unwanted incidents with a validation criterion where the criterion was not fulfilled. 4
5.3
Number of unwanted incidents with a validation criterion where it is undecided whether the criterion was fulfilled or not, i.e. that we are uncertain whether one or more of the values of the indicators referred to in the criterion are correct. 
D. Data for step V4
In step V4, values were obtained for a number of the indicators remaining after the revision in step V2. Note that the analysis team did not restrict the client experts' collection of indicator values to the 19 (3.6) unique ones used in the validation criteria. The validation criteria were constructed after the collection process had been initiated, and before we received the indicator values from the client experts. Thus, we did not know at the time the collection process was initiated which indicators we would actually be able to use in the validation criteria.
The client experts tried to obtain values for 49 (4.4) out of the 57 (2.6) unique indicators remaining after the revision process in step V2. Of these 49 unique indicators, the experts managed to obtain values for 37 (4.5). Thus, the experts managed to obtain 75% of the values. 13 (4.6) of the obtained values belong to indicators used in the validation criteria. This means that six of the values needed in the evaluation of the validation criteria were not obtained. The result was that five (4.3) of the unwanted incidents with validation criteria could not be evaluated. This meant that we could only validate the likelihood estimates of ten (4.1) of the unwanted incidents, of which eight (4.2) use indicators in their validation criteria from which the incidents' likelihood values can be inferred directly.
E. Data for step V5
The likelihood values of ten of the unwanted incidents, with validation criteria where the necessary indicator values had been obtained, were validated in Step V5 of the validation process. For four (5.1) of the incidents the criteria were fulfilled, for two (5.3) of the incidents we could not say whether the criteria were fulfilled or not because the indicator values used in the criteria were too uncertain, while for the remaining four (5.2) unwanted incidents the criteria were not fulfilled. For two (5.4) out of these four incidents, the client experts decided to change the likelihood value of the incident or a preceding threat scenario, while the likelihood values of the remaining two were not changed.
F. Conclusions based on the data
Based on the data in Table III 
IV. DISCUSSION
In this section we discuss our conclusions from Section III-F and use results from the thematic analysis, when possible, to enhance our understanding with respect to the conclusions.
We conducted a thematic analysis where we identified four high-level themes. These are shown in Table IV . Each theme represents a topic that the interviewees talked about, and that are of interest for discussing the conclusions. More than one theme may be of interest when discussing one conclusion, while for some conclusions we do not have relevant data from the semi-structured interviews.
The interview data on which the results are based comprise 71 text segments. The different segments differ much in size. Some segments refer to only a part of a sentence, while others refer to a number of sentences. For some segments, more than one theme is associated. Their distribution over the different themes is shown in Table IV .
In the following we discuss each of the conclusions identified in Section III-F.
A. Conclusion 1
Two frequency estimates 3 were changed by the client experts as a result of their validation criteria being not fulfilled. The first estimate was originally assigned the first and lowest level on the five-level likelihood scale used, while the second estimate was originally assigned the third level. When changing the likelihood estimates, the first estimate was assigned the third level, while the second estimate was assigned the fifth and highest level.
When changing the likelihood estimate of an unwanted incident, its risk level will often change as well, since the risk level depends on the likelihood value and the consequence value of the unwanted incident. By change in risk level we mean that the risk changes from acceptable to unacceptable or vice versa. A change in the risk level will often have consequences for the type of treatments that are implemented. In our case, however, the risk levels associated with the two unwanted incidents did not change when changing the frequency estimates.
B. Conclusion 2a
It was challenging to identify measureable indicators. Expert E1 supports this.
"It was a challenge in the least because it is terribly difficult to find good indicators of information security, and there were a number of examples where it was actually not possible to find indicators. Even though we had proposals we discovered later that they were not usable. But there were also areas where we came up with indicators that can be used." (E1) Due to lack of appropriate indicators, validation criteria were not specified for nine unwanted incidents. During the revision process many indicators were rejected because their values were not obtainable within the client's organization. One question is whether we should have used more time to identify indicators, while another question is whether we should have involved the client experts during the process of coming up with the initial indicator proposals. With respect to the former question we do believe that we used enough time to identify indicators. According to Table I, we used  about 70 4 hours to identify indicators. With respect to the latter question, all three of the client experts were of the opinion that the analysis team should come up with the initial indicator proposals. Expert E1 even expressed that it would not be a good idea to involve the client experts during the proposal process.
"... I also think that when it comes to indicators, it can be a strength that there is someone outside the company that proposes indicators, that does not have built-in limitations with respect to ideas." (E1) On the other hand, we could perhaps have obtained information from the client experts about what kinds of data, in the form of logs and so on, that are available within their company, prior to proposing indicators. This would likely result in fewer indicator proposals being rejected due to their values being not obtainable. On the other hand, proposing relevant indicators where their values are not obtainable at the time of analysis can also prompt the client organization to implement more measurements, as expressed by expert E2.
"It turned out that some of the measurements that had not been done should perhaps have been done, and that is the experience from what we found here." (E2) For five of the validation criteria the client experts did not manage to obtain the necessary indicator values. There may be several reasons for this. One reason may be that obtaining all the indicator values required too much effort. The client experts tried to obtain values for 49 unique indicators. Out of the 19 unique indicators that ended up being used in validation criteria, they managed to obtain 13 indicator values. It is possible that they would have succeeded for a higher proportion if we had only requested the values for the 19 indicators being used in validation criteria. The reason for requesting all indicator values was that the validation criteria were constructed after the collection process had been initiated, and before we received the indicator values from the client experts. Thus, we did not know at the time the collection process was initiated which indicators we would use in the validation criteria. It would perhaps have been better to first identify the indicators needed in the validation criteria, and then asked the client experts to obtain those.
On the other hand, indicator values that are not used to evaluate the fulfillment of validation criteria are not necessarily useless. The values represent new information that was not available at the time the experts used their judgments to come up with likelihood values. It is possible for the experts to take this new information into account and reconsider their previous judgments.
Another reason for failing to obtain six of the necessary values may be that the client experts postponed the task a little long. This is very likely since we know that many of the indicator values where obtained just before the given deadline. But it can also be the case that the values were not as available as first expected. Expert E2 supports this claim.
"... for me the process went pretty smoothly. I got answers if there had been done measurements, but I also got feedback like "we have no idea"." (E2)
All three experts interviewed believe that indicator values of high quality were obtained. It is however a bit uncertain whether this is actually the case. We know, for instance, that some of the values obtained were just new expert judgments by other experts. Expert E2 told us that he obtained indicator values by asking other people working at the company.
"For those indicators where there are numbers it was pretty easy to find the answers, because it is harder to find the right person who has the correct competence. But in our case it was actually two three people who answered all." (E2)
It is however a bit uncertain how many of the obtained indicator values that are just new expert judgments.
C. Conclusion 2b
Eight out of the 10 validation criteria evaluated use indicators from which incidents' likelihood values can be inferred directly. It is not surprising that it is easier to construct validation criteria by the use of these indicators than by the use of non-inferring indicators, since for the latter indicators it is more challenging to link them to the likelihood estimates of the unwanted incidents. We do not have the client experts' opinions on this matter. They were not asked about the identification of validation criteria in the interviews, since this task was conducted solely by the analysis team.
It should be pointed out that we would have had a larger number of validation criteria using solely non-inferring indicators if we had managed to obtain values for all the 15 validation criteria. If this had been the case, then more than 45% of the evaluated validation criteria would have used only non-inferring indicators. Another thing that should be pointed out is that we do not know to what extent the indicator values that were used in the validation criteria were correct. Also, we must have in mind that it is not trivial to use inferring indicators. The data collected from the security risk analysis shows that for eight out of 19 unwanted incidents their proposed inferring indicators were rejected due to their values not being obtainable within the client's organization.
With indicators and validation criteria we can not straightforward conclude that likelihood estimates should be changed or kept as they are. For instance, even though if we manage to obtain correct indicator values, it is not certain that the validation criterion using these values is correct. In the risk analysis we had two cases where the client experts decided not to change the likelihood estimates of the two unwanted incidents, even though the validation criteria were not fulfilled. We can think of a number of possible reasons for why the experts acted as they did. Both unwanted incidents had been assigned the second lowest likelihood value possible. In the case of the first unwanted incident, the likelihood value should have, according to the validation criterion, been increased because the validation criterion was not fulfilled. During the risk analysis, the client experts told us, however, that the value of the indicator used in the criterion did not represent a typical value. In the case of the second unwanted incident, its value, according to the validation criterion, should actually have been set to zero, i.e. that the incident could not occur. Due to this, the incident should actually have been removed from the threat diagram. For the incident to occur some kind of technology needed to be in use, but the indicator value stated that such technology was not in use. The client experts may have thought it was best to keep the incident in the threat diagram in case the technology would be used in the future. For the latter the experts might found no harm in keeping the incident in the diagram due to its low likelihood value.
V. THREATS TO VALIDITY
The main threat to the validity of the conclusions presented in Section III-F is, of course, the fact that the investigation was carried out in a single risk analysis case. We should therefore be careful when generalizing the results. It is possible that a different case would have yielded completely different results. However, we do not believe this is the case, for a number of reasons. First, based on experiences from our previously conducted risk analyses we believe that the analysis is representative with respect to target and scope. Second, based on the same experiences we believe that the client experts are representative with respect to experience and background, as well as are their behavior and roles in the analysis.
Based on the above considerations, in the following we present what we believe are the most significant threats to the validity of our conclusions:
• This was the first time the analysis team used indicators in an industrial setting. On the other hand, the analysis team has some experience with indicators from an academic setting. It is therefore possible that we as analysts have more knowledge about indicators than most other analysts that are first and foremost skilled in the area of risk analysis.
• In a risk analysis we most often use experts with different areas of expertise. It is therefore not unthinkable that experts having indicators and security metrics as their field of expertise may participate in risk analyses involving the use of indicators. Based on this we cannot say that the client experts are representative when it comes to understanding the relation between indicator values and likelihood estimates, and when it comes to knowledge about indicators.
• In our particular case the client experts knew quite often who to ask when they needed data. This does not need to be the case in other organizations. It may also be the case that the client organization, addressed in this paper, is different from other organizations when it comes to logging of risk and security related information. Based on this we cannot say that the client organization is representative with respect to the amount of risk and security related information logged and with respect to having an overview of this data, i.e. knowing what kind of data that is logged and knowing whose in charge for the different data.
• This was the first time the analysis team documented the experiences of the participating experts by the use of semi-structured interviews. Since the analysts are not skilled in interviewing, it is possible that a more professional interviewer would have asked different questions and could perhaps have extracted more interesting information from the interviewees, where as this information could have lead to a different understanding and interpretation of the data collected during the analysis. However, we do not believe that this would have resulted in big differences, since the data collected during the analysis can mainly speak for itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have reported on experiences from using indicators to validate expert judgments in a security risk analysis conducted in 2010. The experiences build on data collected during the analysis and on semi-structured interviews with the client experts that participated in the analysis. This empirical data has been used to evaluate to what extent indicators may be used to validate likelihood values based on expert judgments in a security risk analysis.
The empirical data shows that indicators can bring forward new information, useful for detecting flaws in the expert judgments used to come up with the likelihood estimates. In the analysis from 2010, this new information resulted in that two out of 28 likelihood estimates were changed.
The data also shows that there are some challenges that need to be addressed in order to get the most out of an indicator-based approach to validation of expert judgments. More specifically, we identified the following two main challenges:
• Identification of relevant indicators for which values can actually be obtained within the available time and resources for the analysis.
• Identification of validation criteria, i.e. definition of expected indicator values based on the experts' likelihood estimates. We therefore see the need of good methods to address these challenges. This is something that we plan to address in future work.
One important experience from the security risk analysis is that the client experts, when presented with indicator proposals for which they did not have available data, became aware of new things that should be measured. This new knowledge may result in the implementation of new measurements, from which future risk analyses may benefit.
